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Change in Condition and New
Accident: The Difference Between
the Two, Elements of Each, and
Burdens of Proof
by Michael F. Antonowich*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is designed as a survey of the law on the theories of new

accident and change in condition. It will compare and contrast these two
theories, which compromise one of the most often litigated areas of
workers' compensation law. The respective burdens of proof are placed
on the employee/claimant and the employer/insurer when either alleges
a change in condition, either for the better or for the worse. These
burdens are addressed both as to accidents occurring before and after
July 1, 1992. Also addressed are the circumstances and attendant
outcomes when more than one employer or insurance company is
involved.

The entire focus of this Article is premised on the understanding that
a compensable accident has already occurred. If the employee's
condition thereafter improves, the employer/insurer will assert this
change for the better in an effort to suspend payment of indemnity
benefits. From the employee's viewpoint, the change in condition theory
arises after a compensable accident, followed by at least a partial
recovery by the employee and a subsequent deterioration in the
employee's condition to the point of renewed disability. Under these
circumstances, the employee will seek reinstatement of benefits at the
expense of the employer/msurer involved in the original accident.

* Attorney at Law, Neely & Player, Atlanta, Georgia. Denison University (B.A., 1980);
Wake Forest University (J.D., 1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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When the employee brings an argument alleging a change in condition
for the worse or, alteratively, the occurrence of a new accident, the focal
point of the investigation becomes the attendant facts and circumstances
concerning the original accident, the employee's physical condition
subsequent to that accident, and the circumstances surrounding the
employee's return to work including the employee's work activities. The
salient point is that the theories of change in condition and new
accident, whether fictional or actual, only come into play after a
compensable on-the-job injury,
II. Nzw ACCIDENT
General Considerations
In CentralState Hospital v. James,1 the court of appeals annunciated
two specific circumstances in which a new accident, as opposed to a
change in condition, would exist.2 The first situation, important for
statute of limitations considerations, occurs when an employee is injured
but continues to work, and at some later date the injury becomes
disabling and forces the employee to cease working.3 The date when the
employee is forced to discontinue working is considered the date on
which the disability manifests itself and the date of the new accident.4
The second situation occurs when the employee has been injured,5
recovers, and subsequently suffers a second specific disabling injury.
"In these circumstances the second accident which aggravated the preexisting condition is a new injury, if the second accident at least
partially precipitated the claimant's disability."'

A.

When an Employee Continues to Work After an Injury
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 34-9-82(a)
provides that "[t]he right to compensation shall be barred unless a claim
therefor is filed within one year after injury ... " for all injuries
sustained after July 1, 1978.' Prior to July 1, 1978, the Georgia statute
provided a one year statute of limitations which commenced running on

B.

1. 147 Ga. App. 308, 248 S.E.2d 678 (1978).
2. Id. at 309, 248 S.E.2d at 679.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440, 126 S.E.2d 907
(1962)); see also City of Marietta v. Kirby, 210 Ga. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 762 (1993).
7. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
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8 This distinction is pivotal in claims for initial
the date of the accident!
compensation because the disability engendered by the accident may not
manifest itself within one year. Theoretically, an employee involved in
an accident on January 2, 1977, but suffering no disability until
January 2, 1978, would be foreclosed from asserting an otherwise
meritorious claim. In response to this malevolent result, repugnant to
the very underpinnings of the workers' compensation system, the courts
developed the new accident theory, also referred to as the fictional
accident theory.
The new accident theory posits that the statute of limitations will not
commence running until the disability from an accident manifests
itself.9 A prime example of the rationale behind this theory is found in
Employers Fire Insurance Co. v. Heath.'0 The employee in Heath was
employed trimming trees from high voltage wires. In 1972 he was hit
in his left eye by a wood chip. The employee kept working, losing time
only for medical attention, and filed no claim for compensation. In 1977
his vision worsened to the point of requiring an operation to remove a
cataract from his left eye. 1
When he filed his claim in 1977, both the Administrative Law Judge
("AI") and the Full Board of Workers' Compensation ("Full Board")
found the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.1 " Applying the
new
accident theory, the court of appeals found the claim to be
compensable
and not time barred.' 3

Here, the date of the injury under the "new accident" theory was the
date the claimant was forced to cease employment or when the gradual
loss of his sight prevented him from working since he continued in his
employment after the injury to his eye in 1972 until,14 as a result of the
injury, he was forced to terminate his employment.
The new accident theory similarly affects the statute of limitations
when an employee is injured, returns to work, and subsequently suffers
an aggravation of the pre-existing infirmity. In these situations, the
statute of limitations does not commence on the date of disability

8. Ga. Code § 114-709 (1933).
9. Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 487, 125 S.E.2d 72 (1962).
10. 152 Ga. App. 185, 262 S.E.2d 474 (1979).
11. Id. at 185-86, 262 S.E.2d at 475.
12. Id. at 186, 262 S.E.2d at 475.

13. Id. at 187, 262 S.E.2d at 475.
14. Id., 262 S.E.2d at475-76. See also Bryan County Emergency Medical Servs. v. Gill,

187 Ga. App. 125, 369 S.E.2d 495 (1988); House v. Echota Cotton Mills, Inc., 129 Ga. App.
350, 199 S.E.2d 585 (1973); Blackwell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Ga. 174, 196 S.E.2d 129
(1973).
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resulting from the first accident. Rather, the claimant has one year from
the disability date of the aggravating condition to file his claim.15
One important point to remember in this context is that a specific,
identifiable accident is not needed to revitalize the previous injury"5
When "the employment contributes to the aggravation of the pre-existing
injury, it is an accident under our compensation law, and is compensable, and it is not necessary that there be a specific job-connected incident
which aggravates the previous injury." "
A change in condition, not a new accident, occurs when an employee
is injured, receives compensation, returns to work without fully
recovering, and then becomes disabled without an aggravating occurrence.18 In Hughes the court of appeals held:
IThat even if the wear and tear of ordinary life or ordinary work to
some extent aggravates a pre-existing infirmity, when that infirmity
itself, stemming from the original trauma, continues to worsen, the
point where the employee is no longer able to continue his work is not
a new accident but is a change of physical and economic condition
entitling the claimant to compensation under the original award. 9

15. See Department of Pub. Safety v. Boatright, 188 Ga. App. 612, 373 S.E.2d 770
(1988); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Ivy, 118 Ga. App. 299, 163 S.E.2d 435 (1968); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. V. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440, 126 S.E.2d 907 (1962).
16. Addictions caused by the use of drugs or medicines prescribed for the treatment of
the initial injury by an authorized physician have been held to be compensable under
certain circumstances.
The addiction (can] only be considered a pre-existing condition, if at all, if it was
"caused by" the medications prescribed for the first injury. It is not enough that
the medication for the first injury "worsened" an already existing addiction, which
was further worsened by medication prescribed for the new injury.
Fulmer Bros., Inc. v. Kersey, 190 Ga. App. 573, 576, 379 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1989). See also
Waffle House, Inc. v. Bozeman, 194 Ga. App. 860, 392 S.E.2d 48 (1990).
17. Home Indem. Co. v. Brown, 141 Ga. App. 563, 566, 234 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1977). See
Home Ins. Co. v. McEachin, 151 Ga. App. 567, 260 S.E.2d 560 (1979); Thomas v. Ford
Motor Co., 123 Ga. App. 512, 181 S.E.2d 874 (1971); see also Bryan County Emergency
Medical Servs. v. Gill, 187 Ga. App. 125, 126, 369 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1988) which states:
"[Wihere the claimant is injured on the job but continues to perform the duties of his
employment until such time that he is forced to cease work because of the gradual
worsening of his condition which was at least partly attributable to his physical activity
in continuing to work subsequent to his injury, the date of the injury for purposes of the
running of the statute of limitation[s] is the date the 'disability manifests itself and on that
date is a 'new accident.'"
Id. However, this may not be the case where the employee never fully recovers from his
original injury.
18. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 125 Ga. App. 328, 187 S.E.2d 551
(1972).
19. Id. at 330, 187 S.E.2d at 553. See also Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Babyak, 186 Ga. App. 339, 341, 367 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1988) ("A necessary factual
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Again, the pivotal distinction is that a new accident refers to a claim
for initial compensation, whereas a change in condition refers to a
compensation claim pursuant to a previous award or the voluntary
If a claim for a change
payment of benefits by the employer/insurer
in condition exists, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b) sets out a two-year
statute of limitations period that commences with the filing of notice and
For new accident claims,
the employer making final payment. 2
however, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82(a) provides for a one-year statute of
limitations commencing on the date the disability prohibits the claimant
from working.'
Specific Second Accident
James delineated a second situation in which a new accident could
occur.' This situation occurs when an employee is injured, recovers,
then suffers a specific job-related accident that serves to aggravate the
prior injury.' If this second accident at least partially precipitates the
employee's disability, it is a new accident.' "This is true whether the
claimant is immediately disabled or if he continues to work after the
second accident and his condition gradually worsens until he is forced to
cease his employment."2
The court of appeals faced this situation in Mutual Savings Life
Insurance Co. v. Pruitt.27 The claimant in Pruitt required surgery
when he originally injured his back in a compensable accident on or
about October 31, 1979. He reinjured his back in October 1980 and
again in July 1981. The last accident required a second operation. The
treating physician stated the 1981 accident could have been caused by
the weakness or instability resulting from the 1979 accident. 28 The
court of appeals held that, since the 1981 accident was a specific
C.

predicate to a determination that a 'change in condition,' rather than a'new injury' (or'new
accident'), has occurred is that there has previously been an award (or equivalent) for the
injury whose worsening has produced the present disability").
20. Slattery Assocs., Inc. v. Hufstetler, 161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).
21. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (1992). See Dunawavv. R.I.A.S., Inc., 176 Ga.App. 181,182,
335 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1985).
22. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1992).
23. 147 Ga. App. at 309, 248 S.E.2d at 679.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citation omitted).
27. 178 Ga. App. 476, 343 S.E.2d 495 (1986).
28. Id. at 477, 343 S.E.2d at 496.
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accident that aggravated a pre-existing condition, it constituted a new
accident.'
Thus, a second specific accident is treated just as an initial compensable accident. Both are considered original claims for compensation. In
either case, the claimant's previously impaired condition is of no
consequence.
If the employee's disability results as the immediate consequence of an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, it matters
not that it combines with a pre-existing injury or disease, or that the
accident would not have resulted in disablement except for the prior
condition, or even that if the accident had not occurred at the time and
place it did it might have subsequently occurred in some manner
unrelated to the employment, or might eventually have occurred in any
event.3'
D. When There Are Two or More Employers
A third situation exists, not contemplated directly in James, in which
a new accident will, or at least could, be found. The situation occurs
when an employee is injured and returns to work with a different
employer or employers and again becomes disabled. If a specific accident
occurs at the second place of employment, that employer is obviously
liable, even under James.31 If, however, some question exists about the
source of the disability occurring at a subsequent employer, how is this
situation to be resolved?
One of the first cases to confront this question was House v. Echota
Cotton Mills, Inc. 2 The claimant was originally injured in May of 1970
and voluntarily quit working on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, the claimant
worked in an assortment of capacities with other employers until May
1972, when he was forced to quit work due to the gradual deterioration

29. Id. at 478, 343 S.E.2d at 497. See City of Atlanta v. Gentry, 184 Ga. App. 8, 360
S.E.2d 611 (1987).
30. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Bryant, 123 Ga. App. 412, 412, 181 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1971). See
Atlanta Care Convalescence Ctr. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 283, 370 S.E.2d 40
(1988); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Goswick, 116 Ga. App. 384, 157 S.E.2d 304 (1967);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Childers, 110 Ga. App. 466, 138 S.E.2d 923 (1964); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440, 126 S.E.2d 907 (1962). See also McLeroy Plumbing
Serv., Inc. v. Starks, 201 Ga. App. 270, 271, 410 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1991) ("[IThe second
accident which aggravated the pre-existing condition is a new injury, if the second accident
at least partially precipitated the claimant's disability. The same rule would apply to
accidents which aggravate a pre-existing congenital condition."); SMB Stageline, Inc. v.
Leach, 204 Ga. App. 229, 418 S.E.2d 791 (1992).
31. 147 Ga. App. 308, 248 S.E.2d 678 (1978).
32. 129 Ga. App. 350, 199 S.E.2d 585 (1973).
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of his back condition. He subsequently filed a claim against Echota
Cotton Mills, his employer at the time of his original injury.3
The court of appeals held the claimant had made an initial claim for
compensation and therefore was time barred by the one-year statute of
limitations." Since he was not disabled until 1972, the court concluded
this claim must rest upon the new accident theory.' Based upon the
fact that the "newer accident" did not occur until years after the
claimant left Echota Cotton Mills' employ, the case was dismissed
pursuant to the statute of limitations of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82.'
This ruling establishes that under the new accident theory an initial
claim is to be brought against the party employing the claimant when
the disability arises.37 Further, whether this employer was the
employer on the date of the original accident is irrelevant.'
The benchmark case in this area, however, was Certain v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.39 The focus of the court of appeals in
Certain was whether new work-related circumstances intervened
between job duties at two separate employers.4" Specifically, the
employee sustained an accident at employer one for which he received
compensation. He later returned to the same employer in a light duty
capacity. Some two days after returning, the claimant quit employer one
to go to work for employer two. He then worked for five months with
employer two, performing the same type of strenuous activities he had
done at employer one before his injury. As evidenced by his light duty
work release, he had been medically forbidden from doing this. By the
end of this five month period, the claimant's condition deteriorated to the
point of total disability although he had suffered no specific accident.4 1
The court prefaced its opinion by stating that "where there is no actual
new accident, ordinarily the distinguishing feature that will characterize
the disability as either a 'change of condition' or a 'new accident' is the
intervention of new circumstances."4 The court further held that the
switch from medically approved light duty work to normal duty work
without medical approval constituted "new circumstances. 43 These

33.
34.

Id. at 350-51, 199 S.E.2d at 585-86.
Id. at 352, 199 S.E.2d at 587.

35. Id.
36.
37.

Id. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82 (1992).
129 Ga. App. at 352, 199 S.E.2d at 587.

38. Id.
39. 153 Ga. App. 571, 266 S.E.2d 263 (1980).
40. Id. at 573, 266 S.E.2d at 264.
41. Id. at 571-72, 266 S.E.2d at 263.
42. Id. at 573, 266 S.E.2d at 264.
43. Id.
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new circumstances led to the inability to continue working for employer
two; thus, the claimant suffered a "new accident" while employed by
employer two." Consistent with the earlier discussion of new accidents, the date of the new accident was the date the disability manifested itself.4 5
The first case to fully interpret the new accident theory as set out in
Certain was Slattery Associates, Inc. v. Hufstetler.' In Slattery the
claimant injured his back in January 1979 and received compensation
benefits until he returned to work. The claimant, however, continued to
experience back pain. The claimant was laid off in September 1979 and
secured alternative employment three weeks later. His job duties at the
second employer were similar to those at the first, but they were not
more strenuous. Due to his continued back problems, however, the
claimant was only able to work two and a half days over a two week
period. On October 20, 1974, the claimant started working at a third
employer, again doing less strenuous work than he had done at the first
employer. Although he never suffered a specific accident other than
with his first employer, the claimant was forced to quit work on
December 17, 1979 due to intolerable back pain.47 The distinguishing
point between Slattery and House, is that an earlier award of compensation had been granted to the claimant in Slattery."
The court of appeals in Slattery then set out the following rule:
[Wihen other employment intervenes between an original award of
compensation and a claimant's subsequent disability, an award against
the original employer based upon "change of condition" is not, as a
matter of law, barred unless the subsequent employment, in which the
gradual worsening condition occurred, evidences a work environment
and work circumstances which are "new" and "different" from those
existing in the claimant's previous "ordinary work." It is only then
that it can be said that the claimant has suffered a compensable
"accident" arising out of his subsequent employment rather than a
mere economic "change of condition" proximately resulting from his
original "accident. 49

44.
45.
72.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.

See Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. at 487, 125 S.E.2d at
161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).
Id. at 390, 288 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 394, 288 S.E.2d at 659; 129 Ga. App. at 350, 199 S.E.2d at 585.
161 Ga. App. at 395, 288 S.E.2d at 660.
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In applying the above-stated rule to the facts of the case, the court
upheld the award against the first employer for a change in condition.'
The court stated that the claimant's subsequent jobs intervened in
merely a temporal sense, not in an injury precipitating causal sense.51
The court focused on the types of duties the claimant performed at his
original and subsequent employers and found the duties to be so similar
that no new or different circumstances existed.62
The circumstances upon which a new accident could be found in a
situation with more than one employer were further refined in Beers
Construction Co. v. Stephens." After canvassing some of the earlier
cases, the court of appeals delineated three instances that dictate the
finding of a new accident." One arises when the employee performs
work for a second employer that independently aggravates his condition. 6 The second occurs when the employee performs work for a
second employer beyond the usual, ordinary, or normal limits of the
work that he had been performing for his original employer.' The
third, consistent with the holding in Certain,"' arises when the
requisite job duties at the subsequent employer are more strenuous than
those performed for the first."
In any and all of these situations, barring unusual circumstances, the
resulting disability constitutes a new accident.59 Further, when any of
these three situations exist, the first employer is relieved of liability
from the resulting disability as a matter of law."
The case of Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bobchak,1 however,
illustrates that even if an employee's disability can be traced to a specific
incident while employed for a second employer, the disability will not
necessarily be the product of a second injury.8 2 In Lockheed the
claimant fractured his knee in August 1987, while working for W.H.
Gross Construction Company. He received disability benefits until he

50. Id. at 395-96, 288 S.E.2d at 660-61.
51. Id. at 396, 288 S.E.2d at 661.
52. Id., 288 S.E.2d at 660-61. See Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bobchak, 194 Ga.
App. 156, 390 S.E.2d 82 (1990).
53. 162 Ga. App. 87, 290 S.E.2d 181 (1982).
54. Id. at 89-91, 290 S.E.2d at 182-84.
55. Id. at 90, 290 S.E.2d at 183.
56. I&
57. 153 Ga. App. 571, 573, 266 S.R.2d 263, 264 (1980).
58. 162 Ga. App. at 90, 290 S.E.2d at 183.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 91, 290 S.E.2d at 184.
61. 194 Ga. App. 156, 390 S.E.2d 82 (1990).
62. Id. at 156, 390 S.E.2d at 83.

MERCER LAW REWEW

[Vol. 46

began working for Lockheed Missiles & Space Company in October 1987.
On February 25, 1988, after climbing a ladder, the claimant experienced
a "tired and weak feeling" in the knee he had fractured the year before.
The knee eventually required further surgery.'
The issue in Lockheed was which employer's insurance company was
liable for the claimant's disability benefits.6 To make this determination, the court of appeals had to decide whether the claimant's disability
resulted from a new accident or a change in condition.' The ALJ
found the claimant had suffered a change in condition.6 The Full
Board affirmed this ruling. The superior court reversed the board on
two grounds. First, no evidence existed to prove the claimant's condition
had gradually worsened as a result of the activity connected with his
normal duties. Second, the evidence failed to support the board's finding
that a67 specific accident had not aggravated the claimant's prior
injUry.

The court of appeals .reversed the superior court and, drawing on
language used in Beers, stated:
[We do not believe that in all cases where the worsening of a preexisting condition can be traced to a "specific incident" occurring on the
new job, that incident must necessarily be considered a "new accident."
Rather, the determinative inquiry is whether the circumstances
associated with the incident and with the new employment in general
were "such as to independently aggravate the condition" or whether the
renewed impairment instead resulted from the "wear and tear of
ordinary life in connection with performance of normal duties .... "N
In reaching the decision that the ALJ had been justified in concluding
that the claimant suffered a change in condition, the court noted three
factors.6 9 First, the claimant's duties at Lockheed were no more
strenuous than they had been at W.H. Gross.7" Second, the claimant
had experienced continued stiffness in his knee.71 Finally, a physician
testified that people who suffer fractures like the claimant's never fully
recover and often require additional surgery every two to five years. 72
63. Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
181).

Id. at 156-57, 390 S.E.2d at 83.
Id.
Id. at 157, 390 S.E.2d at 83.
Id.
Id. at 158, 390 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Beers, 162 Ga. App. at 90-91, 290 S.E.2d at

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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One final point to remember, "[wihere employment with a different
employer intervenes between the original job-related injury and the
subsequent claim, the 'new accident' claim cannot be asserted against
the original employer but must be brought against the employer for
whom the employee worked at the time of the 'new accident."' 73 From
a tactical standpoint, nothing prevents claimants from filing alternative
claims. Claimants may file claims against the parties employing them
at the time of their injuries under the change in condition theory. At the
same time, they may also file a contemporaneous claim against a
subsequent employer alleging either an actual new accident or a fictional
new injury claim.
E. When There Are Two or More Insurance Companies
When an employee is injured and the on risk insurance company
subsequently changes, the question becomes which insurance company
is liable for the employee's disability. "The test to be applied in this case
is whether or not there was a subsequent industrial accident which
would of itself constitute the cause of the disability."74 In other words,
the assessment of liability hinges upon the determination of whether the
employee had a new accident or a change in condition. The new accident
or change in condition determination is predicated upon whether an
award of compensation had previously been.made."
Whenever an individual suffers a second specific accident an initial
claim for compensation exists to the extent that the employer/insurer on
risk at the time of that accident will bear liability. In Columbus
Intermediate Care Home, Inc. v. Johnston,7 6 the claimant injured her
shoulder while at work and received workers' compensation benefits
from U.S. Fire Insurance Company. Workers' compensation coverage
was provided by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company after the claimant
recovered from her injury and returned to work. The claimant later
suffered a specific re-injury to her shoulder that was determined to be
a new accident for which Aetna Casualty arid Surety Company was
liable.77 The difficulty arises when no specific second accident occurs.
The question in these situations is whether a change in condition
attributable to the original injury has occurred, an independent
aggravation has occurred, or new circumstances have interceded. The

73. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Norman, 173 Ga. App. 198, 203,325 S.E.2d 810,

814 (1984).
74. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 135 Ga. App. 128, 131, 217 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1975).

75. Id. at 131, 217 S.E.2d at 331.
76. 196 Ga. App. 516, 396 S.E.2d 268 (1990).
77. Id. at 516-17, 396 S.E.2d at 268.
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various theories examining this question are best exemplified by a
comparison of two lines of cases, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
White,7' and its progeny as compared to HartfordAccident & Indemnity
Co. v. Troglin79 and its progeny.
In Troglin the claimant was injured, received a compensation award,
then returned to work with a different employer and was covered by a
different insurance carrier. The claimant thereafter ceased working and
filed a claim for disability benefits." The court held that "[hlis present
total disability was the result of the gradual worsening of his condition
due to the normal wear and tear of performing the normal duties of his
employment and was therefore a change in condition."8" Thus, the
insurance company on risk at the time of the original injury was found
liable. 2 The court made no mention as to whether one job was more
strenuous or physically demanding than the other. The court did,
however, distinguish, Toglin from White on the basis that the claimant
in Troglin was awarded compensation prior to returning to work.83
A similar holding was presented in St. Paul Fire& Marine Insurance
Co. v. Hughes." As in Troglin, the claimant in Hughes was injured in
a compensable accident and was working at a different employer when
forced to quit. The claimant stated that he suffered no new injury or
independent aggravation of his original injury. The employer/insurer at
the time of the original accident argued the claimant did sustain a job
connected aggravation of his condition while at the subsequent employer.
Based on this aggravation, the employer/insurer asserted that the
original injury could therefore not be considered as causally relating to
the renewed disability.'
The court of appeals discounted the argument of the claimant's initial
employer/insurer, finding the initial employer/insurer liable based on the
claimant having undergone a change in condition.' In so doing, the
court set out the following rule:
[T]hat even if the wear and tear of ordinary life or ordinary work to
some extent aggravates a pre-existing infirmity, when that infirmity

78. 139 Ga. App. 85, 227 S.E.2d 886 (1976).
79. 148 Ga. App. 715, 252 S.E.2d 213 (1979).
80. Id. at 715.16, 252 S.E.2d at 213-14.

81. Id. at 716, 252 S.E.2d at 214.
82. Id.
83. Troglin, 148 Ga. App. at 715, 252 S.E.2d at 213-14 (citing White, 139 Ga. App. at
85, 227 S.E.2d at 886).
84. 125 Ga. App. 328, 187 S.E.2d 551 (1972).
85. Id. at 328-30, 187 S.E.2d at 552-53.
86. Id. at 330, 187 S.E.2d at 553.

19941

CHANGE IN CONDITION

itself, stemming from the original trauma, continues to worsen, the
point where the employee is no longer able to continue his work is not
a new accident but is a change of physical and economic condition
entitling the claimant to compensation under the original award. 7
The landmark case on the new accident side is Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. White.' In White the claimant sustained a knee
injury on May 1, 1972, at which time the Hartford Insurance Company
was on risk. After his injury, the claimant switched jobs within the
same employer to one requiring a significantly greater amount of
standing. As of February 1973, Liberty Mutual took over the employer's
workers' compensation coverage. The claimant initially lost no time
from work as a result of her injury and continued to work until April 20,
1973. She was forced to stop at that time due to her worsened knee
condition. 8"
The Deputy Director found that aggravation over a period of time
caused claimant's knee condition to gradually worsen to the point where
she was forced to quit.' At the time the claimant quit, she was
covered by a different insurance company than the one on risk on the
date of the actual accident."' A new injury was found on the date the
claimant was unable to continue working because of the aggravation of
this pre-existing infirmity" As it was a new injury, the insurance
carrier on risk on the date of disability, Liberty Mutual, was liable.93
The pivotal distinction to be drawn between Troglin and White, and
their respective progenies, is the prior compensation award in the former
category."4 Without such an award no change of condition can be found
to exist. 95 Hence, a new accident was found in White."s The insur-

87. Id. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 135 Ga. App. 128, 217 S.E.2d 329 (1975)
(holding that although there might have been some aggravation of the pre-existing injury,
it was insufficient to constitute a new accident and therefore the original employer and
insurer were liable); DeSoto Falls, Inc. v. Brown, 187 Ga. App. 830, 371 S.E.2d 462 (1988)
(holding that the renewed disability was undisputedly related to the previous injury).
88. 139 Ga. App. 85, 227 S.E.2d 886 (1976).
89. Id. at 86, 227 S.E.2d at 886.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Id. at 87, 227 S.E.2d at 887.
93. Id. See also State Wholesalers, Inc. v. Parks, 194 Ga. App. 900, 392 S.E.2d 64
(1990); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Chesire, 178 Ga. App. 539,343 S.E.2d 753 (1986); Fairfield Plantation v. Parmer, 173 Ga. App. 619, 327 S.E.2d 580 (1985); Carriers Ins. Co. v. Myers, 151
Ga. App. 674, 261 S.E.2d 423 (1979).
94. See Troglin, 148 Ga. App. 715, 252 S.E.2d 213; White, 139 Ga. App. 85, 227 S.E.2d
886.
95. See O.C.GA. § 34-9-104 (1992).
96. 139 Ga. App. at 87, 227 S.E.2d at 887.
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ance company on risk at the time of the actual injury was relieved of
liability by the finding of a new accident." The rather harsh consequence of this finding is that the insurance company on risk at the time
the disability manifests itself is liable, even though no job related
accident occurred during its coverage.
The inequities of this method of assigning liability are perhaps best
evidenced by the case of St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Norman."5 The claimant in this case sustained a knee injury while
employed at a medical clinic in 1974. Her employer, one of the clinic
physicians, performed a knee operation in May 1974. No compensation
claim was filed because the claimant's employer paid the claimant's
salary in lieu of compensation. The claimant returned to work some two
months later.9
In 1974, when the accident occurred, the insurance company on risk
was the Bituminous Casualty Company. At the beginning of 1981, St.
Paul took over coverage of the clinic. The claimant's knee never fully
recovered and a second operation was performed. The claimant was out
of work from January 15, 1981 until April 6, 1981.'00
The ALJ and the Full Board found that the claimant had undergone
a change in condition. 1 The superior court, holding that the board's
determination was a reviewable conclusion of law and not a finding of
fact, reversed and held that a new accident had occurred.'0 2 The
superior court refused to give credit for the salary paid to the claimant
and awarded the claimant temporary total disability benefits from
January 15 until April 6, 1981.03 The court also awarded.$19,989.53
in accrued medical expenses as well as future medical expenses.'"° All
awards were assessed against claimant's employer and St. Paul.'0 5
Bituminous Casualty was let completely off the liability hook.
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's award."° The
appeals court found that because the claimant's condition had gradually
worsened due to a pre-existing work-related injury and the claimant had

97. Id.
98. 173 Ga. App. 198, 325 S.E.2d 810 (1984).
99. Id. at 199, 325 S.E.2d at 811.
100. Id., 325 S.E.2d at 811-12.
101. Id., 325 S.E.2d at 812.
102. Id. at 201, 325 S.E.2d at 813; but see Fairfield Plantation v. Parmer, 173 Ga. App.
619, 620, 327 S.E.2d 580, 581 (1985) (holding that "Itjhe question of whether a new
accident or a change of condition has occurred is a question of fact for the trier of fact.").
103. 173 Ga. App. at 199, 325 S.E.2d at 812.
104. Id. at 199-200, 325 S.E.2d at 812.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 201, 325 S.E.2d at 813.
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made an initial claim for compensation, as a matter of law, the claimant
had suffered a new accident."0 7 "As to the insurance company, the
employer's workers' compensation carrier at the time of the 'new
accident' is liable for claimant's compensation
rather than the carrier at
08
the time of the original job-related injury."
III.

A.

CHANGE IN CONDITION

Generally
[A] "change in [one's] condition" means a change in the wage-earning
capacity, physical condition, or status of an employee or other
beneficiary covered by this chapter, which change must have occurred
after the date on which the wage-earning capacity, physical condition,
or status of the employee or other beneficiary was last established by
award or otherwise.'

The applicable statute of limitations for a change in condition claim
for an injury suffered after July 1, 1978, is found in O.C.G.A. section 349-104."o Subsection (b) states that any party may bring a change in
condition claim seeking to end, increase, or decrease income benefits so
long as "that at the time of application not more than two years have
elapsed since the date" of final payment of income benefits due under
this chapter."'
The court of appeals in Central State Hospital v. James,"2 annunciated three criteria for distinguishing between a new accident and a
change in condition."' Only one of these facilitated a finding that the
claimant had undergone a change in condition." 4 The example used
in James involved a situation where an employee is injured, receives
compensation, and subsequently returns to normal duty work." 5

107. Id.at 201-02, 325 S.E.2d at 813.
108. Id at 203, 325 S.E.2d at 814. See also State Wholesalers, Inc. v. Parks, 194 Ga.
App. 900,392 S.E.2d 64 (1990); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. McKenzie, 152 Ga. App. 445,
263 S.E.2d 201 (1979); Hartford Ins. Group v. Stewart, 147 Ga. App. 733, 250 S.E.2d 184
(1978).
109. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(aXl) (1992).

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 34-9-104(b).
Id.
147 Ga. App. 308, 248 S.E.2d 678 (1978).
Id. at 309-10, 248 S.E.2d at 679.

114. Id. at 311, 248 S.E.2d at 680.

115. Id. at 309, 248 S.E.2d at 679.
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Then as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life and the activity
connected with performing his normal duties and not because of a
specific job-related incident his condition gradually worsens to the
point that he can no longer continue to perform his ordinary work.
This gradual worsening or deterioration would constitute a change in
his condition and not a new accident.116
"'The proper classification of the basis of a claim as an "accident,"

"change of condition," or "new accident" hinges generally upon two
factors: (1) Whether the claim seeks initial or additional compensation
for the "injury"; and, (2) the proximate cause of the injury for which
compensation is being sought.' "" 7
Of course, a claim for initial
compensation is an assertion of an accident or a new accident. A claim
for additional compensation under a prior award is a change in-condition

claim. 118

A claimant bears the burden of proof when bringing a change in
condition claim that necessarily asserts a change in condition for the
worse. 119
7b establish a change of condition, the claimant must show (1) that his
condition had changed for the worse; (2) that because of this change he
was unable to continue at work; (3) that because of his inability to
work, he had either a total or partial loss of income; and (4) that the
inability
to work was proximately caused by the previous accidental
120
injury.

116. Id. at 310, 248 S.E.2d at 679.
117. Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154, 157, 338 S.E.2d 742, 746 (1985).
See also Certain v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 153 Ga. App. 571, 573, 266 S.E.2d
263, 264 (1980) ( Wlhere there is no actual new accident, ordinarily the distinguishing
feature that will characterize the disability as either a 'change of condition' or a 'new
accident' is the intervention of new circumstances.").
118. See Carriers Ins. Co. v. Myers, 151 Ga. App. 674, 675, 261 S.E.2d 423 (1979) ("A
change of condition could not be found since no claim or determination had ever been
made."); Zurich Am. Ins. Cos. v. Sergant, 147 Ga. App. 672, 250 S.E.2d 11 (1978).
119. J & M Transp. Co. v. Crowe, 173 Ga. App. 13, 325 S.E.2d 412 (1984); CornellYoung v. Minter, 168 Ga. App. 325, 309 S.E.2d 159 (1983). See also Independent Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Cox, 207 Ga. App. 402, 427 S.E.2d 862 (1993); Aden's Minit Mkt. v.
Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219,413 S.E.2d 738 (1991); EVCO Plastics v. Burton, 200 Ga. App.
121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991); ITT-Continental Baking Co. v. Powell, 182 Ga. App. 533, 356
S.E.2d 267 (1987).
120. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Jacobs, 163 Ga. App. 727, 728, 296 S.E.2d
80, 80-81 (1982). See also Burton, 200 Ga. App. 121, 122, 407 S.E.2d 60, 62 (1991) ("In
seeking a resumption of benefits, the burden is on the employee to show that, 'after his
termination for cause,' his inability to secure suitable employment elsewhere was
proximately caused by his previous accidental injury.").
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In essence, the claimant's burden boils down to a showing that
unemployment or reduced compensation is causally related to the
original disability claim. In Gilmer v. Atlanta Housing Authority,121
the claimant injured his back and later returned to work with the same
employer. He was later discharged due to on-the-job misconduct. The
ALJ and Full Board found that he had shown a change in economic
condition for the worse and awarded total disability benefits." The
superior court reversed, stating that plaintiffs unemployed status was
not caused by his back injury but rather because he had "voluntarily
committed acts which he knew could result in his termination."'2 3
The court of appeals then reversed the superior court.'U The court
of appeals held that although claimant was discharged for cause, his
12
current loss of earnings was due to his diminished earning capacity.
Since his disability precipitated his diminished earning capacity, the
court 6of appeals held that he was entitled to additional income benefits.

1

Thus, claimants can receive benefits if their disability prevents them
from securing alternative employment, even though their discharge from
suitable employment resulted from their own acts of malfeasance.'2 7
If, however, the acts of malfeasance prevent the claimants from
returning to work, those individuals are not entitled to a resumption of
benefits. Claimants are only entitled to resume benefits if they can show
an ongoing disability attributable to the original injury.
In Freeman v. Continental Baking Co., the employee suffered a
disabling knee injury that required surgery. Upon recovering from that
surgery the employee returned to work and bid on a position in a
different department. The new position would have allowed him to
perform activities within his physical limitations. While the employee
did pass the physical examination to perform the requisite job duties, he
failed the company drug test and was terminated as a result.'
The

121.
122.
123.
124.

170 Ga. App. 326, 316 S.E.2d 535 (1984).
Id. at 326, 316 S.E.2d at 536.
Id at 326-27, 316 S.E.2d at 536.
Id. at 327, 316 S.E.2d at 536.

125. Id.
126. Id. See also Garrard v. Pitts Plumbing Co., 163 Ga. App. 457, 294 S.E.2d 658

(1982); F & G Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Raines, 147 Ga. App. 675, 250 S.E.2d 58 (1978);
Fleming v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 137 Ga. App. 492, 224 S.E.2d 127 (1976);
Beachcamp v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 112 Ga. App. 417, 145 S.E.2d 605 (1965).
127. Georgia Power Co. v. Brown, 169 Ga. App. 45, 311 S.E.2d 236 (1983).

128. Id. at 49, 311 S.E.2d at 239.
129. 212 Ga. App. 855, 443 S.E.2d 520 (1994).
130. Id. at 855-56, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
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court of appeals held that any economic loss suffered by the claimant
was not causally related to the on-the-job injury.'3 1 Rather, claimant's
economic loss resulted from his impermissible drug use that prevented
him from passing the qualifying drug test." 2 The language used by
the court of appeals in Freeman also provides the basis upon which an
employer/insurer can unilaterally suspend payment of benefits.' 3 An
employer/insurer properly suspends benefits based upon a change in
condition when suitable work is available and the employee has the
ability to perform that work.3 4
To carry the burden of proof when they are injured, return to work,
and are subsequently terminated for reasons unrelated to their
accidents, claimants must demonstrate a causal connection between
their original on-the-job injury and any subsequent inability to find
suitable alternative employment.' If claimants simply make no effort
to find suitable alternative employment after termination, they cannot
possibly carry their burden of proof and their claims will be denied.'3 6
In essence, claimants' lack of effort to find alternative employment
preemptively prevents them from carrying their burden of proof. This
burden will be placed on claimants even if they return to work on a light
duty status or at modified or restricted work activities.3 7
In State v. Bardge,' 35 the claimant argued he was unable to seek
alternative employment because he was rendered disabled by an earlier
injury to his arm.3 9 The court of appeals concluded that the claimant's theory that he could not look for alternative employment because
of his disability was "circular."40 "His lack of effort to obtain employment fails to support the burden placed on all claimants, that his
inability4 to find employment was proximately caused by his accidental
injury."' '

131. Id. at 856-57, 443 S.E.2d at 522.
132. Id. at 857, 443 S.E.2d at 522.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Landon, 202 Ga. App. at 219, 413 S.E.2d at 738; see also Burton, 200 Ga. App. at
121, 407 S.E.2d at 60; Powell, 182 Ga. App. at 533, 356 S.E.2d at 267,
136. Atlanta Hilton & Towers v. Gaither, 210 Ga. App. 343, 436 S.E.2d 71 (1993);
Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Meyers, 214 Ga. App. 510, 448 S.E.2d 246 (1994).
137. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cox, 207 Ga. App. 402, 427 S.E.2d 862
(1993).
138. 211 Ga. App. 307, 439 S.E.2d 1 (1993).
139. Id. at 309, 439 S.E.2d at 2.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 309-10, 439 S.E.2d at 2.
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In Autolite v. Glaze,142 the claimant was injured and returned to a
light duty position with her employer. Thereafter, Autolite was forced
to close its plant due to economic conditions. Thus, the claimant was
prevented from continuing her light duty position for reasons unrelated
to her original accident. Subsequent to her lay-off the claimant sought
light duty work but received no offers. 1' It is significant that the
record in this case was silent as to why the claimant did not receive an
offer of alternative employment.'" Based on this silence, the court of
appeals held the claimant had not carried her burden of proving that her
earlier on-the-job injury proximately caused her inability to obtain
suitable alternative employment." The claimant was denied additional income benefits because she failed to draw the necessary causal
connection between her original on-the-job injury and her inability to
find suitable alternative employment subsequent to her lay-off for
economic reasons. 46
When the employer/insurer files a change in condition claim,
necessarily a change in condition for the better, the employer/insurer
bears the burden of proof.4 ' "To terminate compensation because of
change in condition, the employer must show 'a change in the wage
earning capacity, physical condition, or status of an employee,' and to do
so, the employer must show the ability to return to work and that
suitable work is available."1"
In White v. Nantucket Industries,""the employee injured her wrist

while working for Nantucket Industries. After subsequently being
terminated for reasons unrelated to this injury, the employee obtained
alternative employment working as a sitter for an elderly woman. The
claimant was afforded temporary partial disability benefits because she
was unable to generate an average weekly wage equal to or greater than
the amount she had earned at the time of her original injury. The
employee subsequently suffered a fall and broke her leg which prevented
her from sitting for this elderly patient. The employer/insurer thereafter

142. 211 Ga. App. 780, 440 S.E.2d 497 (1994).
143. Id. at 780, 440 S.E.2d at 497.
144. Id. at 781, 440 S.E.2d at 498.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Raley v. Lanco Paint & Drywall, 190 Ga. App. 462, 379 S.E.2d 196 (1989);
Hercules, Inc. v. Adams, 143 Ga. App. 91, 237 S.E.2d 631 (1977); Whitner v. Georgia State
Univ., 139 Ga. App. 212, 228 S.E.2d 200 (1976).
148. Peterson/Puritan, Inc. v. Day, 157 Ga. App. 827, 829, 278 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1981).
See also Johnson Controls, Inc. v. McNeil, 211 Ga. App. 783, 440 S.E.2d 528 (1994); Spell
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 147 Ga. App. 160, 248 S.E.2d 292 (1978).
149. 214 Ga. App. 542, 448 S.E.2d 278 (1994).
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suspended payment of indemnity benefits to the employee and asserted
that the employee should bear the burden of proving a renewed
entitlement to indemnity benefits. The employer/insurer further claimed
that any additional disability subsequent to the leg injury was still
causally related to the original wrist injury. 5 '
The court of appeals reversed the lower court decisions and held that
the employer/insurer should bear the burden of proof in this case.'
The court held that by virtue of the ongoing payment of temporary
partial disability benefits, the employer/insurer recognized the ongoing
disability attributable to the original injury'
Therefore, to suspend
benefits the employer/insurer was the party seeking to prove a change
in condition for the better and the burden of proof was properly placed
on it.' In this case, the employer/insurer was unable to demonstrate
the claimant had sufficiently recovered from her original wrist injury
and could generate a wage equal to or greater than the amount she
earned at the time of her original injury.'
Therefore, the court
concluded the claimant was entitled to ongoing temporary partial
disability benefits, rather than temporary total disability benefits, until
the employer/insurer
could demonstrate a change for the better in her
56
condition.1
With the escalating costs of workers' compensation benefits, employers
are generally becoming more willing to make modified or light duty work
available. The employer/insurer can assert a change for the better in the
claimant's condition by demonstrating that suitable work is available
and the claimant's refusal to return to that proffered position is
unjustifiable. The General Assembly revised O.C.G.A. section 34-9-240,
effective July 1, 1994.'
Apparently, this code section will not apply
retroactively, but only to those accidents occurring on or after July 1,
1994. Of note, however, is that application of the statute still remains
undecided because the court of appeals has not entertained this specific
issue. With this understanding, two possibilities arise in the event the
authorized treating physician releases the individual to return to work
in a limited capacity. Employees will be immediately entitled to a
resumption of their indemnity benefits if a job is tendered pursuant to

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 542, 448 S.E.2d at 278.
Id.at 543, 448 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.GA. § 34-9-240 (Supp. 1994).
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the provisions of Board Rule 240.157 However, employees must demonstrate the inability to perform light duty work for fifteen days or
more.' The burden of proof will remain with the employer/insurer to
demonstrate a change for the better in the claimant's condition, which
still may be proven through the suitability of available work for that
individual 9 In the alternative, if the employee refuses to attempt
the job approved by the authorized treating physician, the employer/insurer is entitled to unilaterally suspend payment of benefits.'
Under this scenario, the burden shifts to the employee to demonstrate
a renewed entitlement to income benefits.161
For accidents occurring prior to July 1, 1994, the general rule is that
the employer/insurer must first receive authorization from the state
board to suspend payment of benefits based upon the refusal of suitable
employment."12 If the employer/insurer is successful in this endeavor
it can, upon authorization from the state board, suspend payment of
indemnity benefits.'
Of course, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2) has
eliminated the necessity of demonstrating the availability of suitable
employment in post July 1, 1992 non-catastrophic accident cases; the
claimant must be released to return to work with restrictions for fiftytwo consecutive weeks or an aggregate of seventy-eight weeks.'" For
all cases with an accident date preceding July 1, 1992 or subsequent to
July 1, 1992 but prior to the running of the threshold limits set out in
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2), the employer/insurer may rely upon the
availability of suitable employment as a means of demonstrating a
change for the better in the claimant's condition." 5 What constitutes
suitable employment is a factual determination often resolved by the
state board. 6' When the proffered job is not suitable, the claimant
maintains his right to receive ongoing indemnity benefits. 6 7

157.

GA. BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 240 (Supp. 1994).

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. But see Freeman v. Continental Baking Co., 212 Ga. App. 855, 856, 443 S.E.2d
520, 521 (1994) (a case in which the court of appeals provided that the employer/msurer
could unilaterally suspend payment of benefits upon a showing that the claimant had the
capacity to return to work and that suitable work was available).
163. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240; GA. BD. OF WORKERS, COMPENSATION R. 240 (1992).
164. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(aX2).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. Walraven, 130 Ga. App. 41, 42, 202 S.E.2d 461, 462
(1973).
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Obviously, an employer fails to offer suitable employment when it
cannot or will not offer a position within the physical limitations
imposed by the claimant's treating physician."' Similarily, a claimant
is not free to reject a proper job so long as the job is suitable to the
claimant's capacity.""9 In McDaniel v. Roper Corp.,17 the court of
appeals upheld the state board decision that the claimant's personal
preference not to work on the second shift did not establish a legitimate
basis for declining a position otherwise suitable to the claimant's
capacity. 71 Since every case presents a distinct factual determination,
no bright line tests can be applied.172 Rather, the overall governing
principles are that the claimant must accept a genuine job offer suitable
to the individual's capacity.173 For the employer/insurer, the governing
principle is that it must make a legitimate job offer suitable to the
claimant's capabilities and, preferably, approved by the authorized
treating physician.174

In Clark v. Georgia Craft Co.,17 the claimant's left arm was amputated. He was later fitted with a prosthetic arm and returned to work
in the company's shipping department. Because this work area was not
air conditioned, claimant experienced considerable difficulties. The
employer offered claimant a position as a courier at the same wage level.
The claimant refused this offer, quit the job in the shipping department,
and sought resumption of his disability benefits.1 76 The court of
appeals upheld the reinstatement of his benefits finding that "a claimant
justifiably could refuse a job where it offered him no challenge and no
opportunity for advancement."17 7

The Georgia Supreme Court has provided some insight into the factors
the Workers' Compensation Board may consider in determining whether
a particular job is suitable employment. In City of Adel v. Wise,178
Wise injured his elbow while on the job. When his doctor suggested that
he perform only light duty work for a time, the city offered him the
temporary position of radio dispatcher. After his recovery, the city was
to return Wise to his former job as fire captain. Wise refused the

168.

Poulnot v. Dundee Mills Corp., 173 Ga. App. 799,801,328 S.E.2d 228,230 (1985).

169. Id. at 801, 328 S.E.2d at 462.
170. 149 Ga. App. 864, 256 S.E.2d 146 (1979).
171. Id. at 864, 256 S.E.2d at 147.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 178 Ga. App. 884, 345 S.E.2d 61 (1986).
176. Id. at 884-85, 345 S.E.2d at 62.

177. Id. at 886, 345 S.E.2d at 63.
178.

261 Ga. 53, 401 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
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dispatcher job because the hours of the job conflicted with a part time
job that he had held for seven years, thus reducing his overall income by
$163 a week. The city discontinued all disability benefits after Wise
refused the position.'
Wise brought an action for reinstatement of his benefits. The AIJ
denied Wise's claim, finding that he had the capacity to perform the job.
The Full Board reversed this decision after determining that the job was
not suitable. s The city appealed to the superior court which found,
due to the economic factors, that the dispatcher job was suitable to his
The court of appeals reversed the
capacity as a matter of law.'
superior court on the grounds that the board could exercise discretion in
determining which jobs were suitable, and that discretionary rulings by
the board should not be reversed absent abuse.' 82 The supreme court
The supreme court specifically
reversed the court of appeals.'
questioned "whether the potential loss of a part-time job may be
considered as a factor in determining whether a job offered by an
The court
employer is 'suitable to the capacity'" of the employee.'
decided that the loss of a part time job was not a valid consideration and
then stated:
We hold that the discretion afforded the board under O.C.G.A. § 34-9240 to determine that an employee's refusal of proffered work is
justified must relate to the physical capacity of the employee to
perform the job; the employee's ability or skill to perform the job; or
factors such as geographic relocation or travel conditions which would
disrupt the employee's life.1s

A unique interpretation of what constitutes available suitable work
occurred in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Weeks." The claimant, the sole owner and operator of a construction company, acted as its
"working president." As such, he was responsible for job bids, job
specifications, procurement of contracts, and the presentation of bids to
potential clients. In February 1977, the claimant was involved in a car
accident while on company business, and suffered a concussion and other
injuries. Due to the injuries suffered, claimant received temporary total

179. Id. at 54, 401 S.E.2d at 523.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id., 401 S.E.2d at 524.
183. Id. at 56, 401 S.E.2d at 525.
184. Id. at 54, 401 S.E.2d at 524.

185. Id. at 56, 401 S.E.2d at 525.
186. 155 Ga. App. 20, 270 S.E.2d 259 (1980).
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disability benefits until May 16, 1978, when the employer/insurer
requested a change in condition hearing. 7
In support of its contention, the employer/insurer produced medical
evidence showing the claimant had undergone a physical improvement
since his accident. Further, the employer/insurer claimed that no
physical barrier prevented the claimant from performing some sort of
remunerative employment. The employer/insurer, therefore, argued that
it had satisfied its burden of proof.'8s
The claimant maintained the company had ceased to be a viable
business due to his inability to work. As the "working president" of a
non-viable business, "there is no work or duties to which he can assign
himself, nor any income from which to pay himself a salary." "9 At the
hearing, the claimant testified that "he supposed there was work he
could do but [he] did not know what it was and nothing had been offered
to him in the way of income-producing labor.""9 No mention was
made of any attempt by the claimant to elicit some type of employment. 191
The court of appeals upheld the position of both the Full Board and
the superior court, holding the claimant was still totally disabled.'92
The court did find, however, that the employer/insurer had "established
that there were medical indications that [claimant) exhibited a physical
ability to do some type of work. [Tihis d[id] not meet the requirement of
a showing that [claimant] had available some work suitable to his
disabled condition, even if with some company not his own."'
Peterson/Puritan,Inc. v. Day' reaffirmed the rationale of Weeks.
With regard to the employer's burden of proof, the court of appeals
stated that "it is clear that it is not enough to show the claimant is
physically able to work". 98 Therefore, "it would be inequitable to
permit the employer to terminate compensation merely because the
claimant's physical condition has improved and she can return to some
form of income producing labor."9 8

187. Id. at 20-22, 270 S.E.2d at 259-60.
188. Id. at 21-22, 270 S.E.2d at 260.
189. Id. at 21, 270 S.E.2d at 260.
190. Id. at 23, 270 S.E.2d at 261.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 157 Ga. App. 827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981).
195. Id. at 829, 278 S.E.2d at 676 (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Weeks, 155 Ga.
App. 20, 270 S.E.2d 259).
196. Id.
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Meanwhile, the same courts nutured a divergent and seemingly hostile
line of cases.
(Ihf the employer and insurer claim a change of condition for the better,
such may be shown even though the claimant is not actually working,
has sought no work, may be unwilling to try to work, or has received
no offer of employment from his former employer or another, if there
is evidence to support a finding of some improvement which discloses
an ability to return to work. 197
This position was reaffirmed in Jackson v. Seaboard Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.'95 Moreover, the court in Jarallah v. Pickett Suite
Hotel,' 9 maintained that
Un order for the board to terminate an employee's eligibility for
benefits, the evidence must prove an improved economic condition.
This is proved by evidence that the employee's physical condition has
improved to the point that he has either already returned to work or
has the ability to return to work.m4
In Jackson, a case decided two years before Weeks, the court found the
employer/insurer had carried its burden of proof by showing an ability
to return to work.2"' "[Tihey were not required to show that [claimant]
The court
had a current offer of employment [or reemployment].'
Baking
v.
Continental
Freeman
further
in
one
step
took
this
appeals
of
Co.'"s In Freeman the court held the employer could unilaterally
suspend payment of benefits based upon a change in condition if the
employer demonstrated that the claimant was capable of returning to
work and that suitable work was available.'
These cases can be synthesized by virtue of the degree to which the
claimant's disability has dissipated. When the claimant has fully
recovered from the job-related disability, the employer/insurer need not
demonstrate the availability of specific work."5 The court of appeals
in Magee held the claimant had fully recovered from her job related
accident and her persisting disability was due to injuries received in a

197.

Hopper v. Continental Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 850, 176 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1970).

198. 144 Ga. App. 531, 241 S.E.2d 636 (1978).
199. 204 Ga. App. 684, 420 S.E.2d 366 (1992).
200. Id. at 685, 420 S.E.2d at 368 (citing Fairway Transp. v. Brenner, 192 Ga. App.
871, 872, 386 S.E.2d 674 (1989)).

201. 144 Ga. App. at 532, 241 S.E.2d at 637.
202. Id.
203. 212 Ga. App. 855, 443 S.E.2d 520 (1994).
204. Id. at 856, 443 S.E.2d at 522.

205. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Magee, 162 Ga. App. 865, 292 S.E.2d 477 (1982).
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car accident."' The court distinguished PetersonIPuritan by stating
that "the claimant was not denied.any further compensation because...
the disability she now has is not connected with her employment." 2 7
Therefore, the question of the availability of work was not in issue."'
Since the claimant in Magee sustained an intervening accident that
precipitated her disabled status after her job related accident, the case
presented a somewhat unusual set of circumstances; the language of the
opinion was therefore commensurately guarded.2'
The thrust of
Magee was, however, made unmistakably clear in Pierce v. AAA Cabinet
2 10
Co.

The claimant in Pierce was injured in a compensable accident and
received benefits for about a year and a half. Upon receipt of a report
that the claimant was medically able to return to work, the employer/insurer terminated benefits. The claimant opted not to return to
work, but sought a hearing contesting the assertion of a change in
condition. 2 ' The AIJ, the Full Board, and the superior court all found
the termination of benefits was proper.2 12
On appeal the claimant argued that since the employer did not
demonstrate work was available, the termination of benefits was
improper.218 In support he relied upon, among others, Georgia Power
Co. v. Brown, 214 Peterson/Puritanv. Day,216 and Commercial Union
Insurance Co. v. Weeks.216
The employer/insurer argued the above cited cases were distinguishable because they involved only a degree of improvement as opposed to
a complete recovery.217 In Weeks and its progeny, the claimants'
conditions improved to a status that allowed them to perform some
work.218 In Pierce and its progeny, however, the claimants fully
recovered and were capable of performing pre-injury work without
restriction.219

206. Id. at 866, 292 S.E.2d at 477.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

173 Ga. App. 463, 326 S.E.2d 575 (1985).
Id. at 463, 326 S.E.2d at 575.
Id.
Id.
169 Ga. App. 45, 311 S.E.2d 236 (1983).
157 Ga. App. 827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981).
155 Ga. App. 20, 270 S.E.2d 259 (1980).
173 Ga. App. at 463, 326 S.E.2d at 576.
Id.
Id.
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The court of appeals affirmed the lower tribunals, and provided a
clear-cut statement of the law.' 0
Since [claimants] continued unemployment is not due to his former
disability, the employer has no further responsibility for [claimant's]
economic condition. That being so, there was no necessity that [the
employer] show that work is available to [the claimant]. Having
recovered from the injury he received in [employer's] employ, [claimant] is in the same position as every other member of the general work
force."
Thus, a showing of the availability of work is not a part of the employer's burden of proof where the claimant has fully recovered from his
injuries
and has been released to normal duty work without restriction.' 2
Of course, claimants will be eligible for benefits if they are capable of
demonstrating that their inability to procure some type of work is
directly related to their disability.' The case of United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Giles,2 ' well illustrates this point.
In Giles, the claimant, an insurance claims adjustor, was injured in a
work related car accident in 1979. He received no income benefits but
did receive medical expenses. In addition, he was determined to have
a twenty percent impairment to the body as a whole. In 1980 claimant
quit his job and took a similar position with a new employer. Due to a
reduction in the new employer's workforce, claimant was laid off in 1983.
Claimant thereafter filed for income benefits based on his 1979
accident. 2 5
The AUJ found claimant had carried his burden and proved a change
in condition from permanent partial disability to total disability under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-261.' 2 This was affirmed by the Full Board and
the superior court.227 The court of appeals upheld the award, citing
McDonald v. Townsend as controlling.'
The distinction between
these two cases is that although claimant's "inability to find work as a
220. Id. at 464, 326 S.E.2d at 577.
221. Id.
222. McDonald v. Townsend, 175 Ga. App. 811, 812, 334 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1985).
223. See Aden's Minit Mkt. v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219,413 S.E.2d 738 (1991); EVCO
Plastics v. Burton, 200 Ga. App. 121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991); ITT-Continental Baking Co. v.
Powell, 182 Ga. App. 533, 356 S.E.2d 267 (1987).
224. 177 Ga. App. 684, 340 S.E.2d 284 (1986).
225. Id. at 684, 340 S.E.2d at 284-85.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 685, 340 S.E.2d at 285 (citing McDonald v. Townsend, 175 Ga. App. 811, 334
S.E.2d 723 (1985)).
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claims adjuster may not be related to his injury, his inability to find
other work for which he is suited is related to his injury."'
The claimant had experience in, and sought positions in, the fields of
construction, teaching, and athletic coaching."0 In finding the claimant was eligible for benefits, the court of appeals stated the now
established rule:
It is not the ability to perform the particular job in which one was
engaged at the time of the injury which is the determining factor in a
case such as this, but rather whether the claimant's inability to find
any work for which he is suited by training and experience is a result
of the injury suffered." 1
B.

Changes Enacted as of July 1, 1992
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2), effective July 1, 1992, applies only to
non-catastrophic cases and establishes a new means for an employer/insurer to demonstrate a change for the better in an injured
employee's condition. 2 Significantly, this code section applies only to
non-catastophic accidents occurring on or after July 1, 1992."s
Equally significant is that this code section in no way impairs or inhibits
the ability of either the employer/insurer or the claimant to establish a
change in condition in the same way that was available to them prior to
the enactment of this statute.'
Pursuant ,to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2), the employer/insurer is
unilaterally empowered to convert payment of temporary total disability
benefits to temporary partial disability benefits if the injured employee
has been able to perform restricted or modified work activities for fiftytwo consecutive weeks. 5 When the injured employee has not been
provided fifty-two consecutive weeks of restricted work releases by the
authorized treating physician, but has amassed an aggregate of seventyeight weeks of restricted work releases, the employer/insurer is also
entitled to convert payment of temporary total benefits to temporary
partial disability benefits."' When either of these quantitative criteria
has been satisfied, the employer/insurer is unilaterally allowed to
convert payment of benefits so long as the procedural prerequisites set

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. See also Cornell-Young v. Minter, 168 Ga. App. 325, 309 S.E.2d 159 (1983).
O.C.GA. § 34-9-104(a)(2) (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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out in Board Rule 104 have been met." 7 Since this code section
applies only where the claimant is not working, in most circumstances
a conversion from temporary total disability to temporary partial
disability will take place. These figures, of course, will depend upon the
date of the accident and the employee's average weekly wage.
When O.C.G.A. section 34-9-261 was revised effective July 1, 1992, a
400 week cap was placed on temporary total disability benefits in
non-catastrophic cases."8 O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262 controls payment
of temporary partial disability benefits and places a 350 week cap on
those disability benefits.' 89 These disability benefits are calculated
from the date of the injury forward.'
When an employer/insurer
utilizes the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2) to convert
temporary total disability payments to temporary partial disability
benefits, the claimant's overall entitlement to income benefits may be
reduced by fifty weeks." 1 A claimant may, however, still subsequently
refile and assert a renewed entitlement to temporary total disability
benefits after having compiled either fifty-two consecutive weeks of
restricted work releases or an aggregate amount of seventy-eight weeks
of restricted work duty releases.'
C.

Two Insurance Companies/Two Employers
As was the case with the finding of a new accident, some question
exists as to who will be held liable when an employee is injured, receives
benefits, and then suffers a change in condition after returning to work
with a different employer or a different insurance carrier. The first
inroad which helped to effectively clear these muddied waters occurred
in Leatherby Insurance Co. v. Hubbard.'43
In Hubbardthe claimant was originally injured in October 1974 when
he fell twenty-six feet and was impaled on a steel rod. He then returned
to work for the same employer in January 1975. On May 14, 1975,
claimant again fell while at work and was2 treated by the same physician
who treated him after his 1974 accident. "
The insurance company on risk during 1974 was Argonaut. Leatherby
took over coverage in January 1975. The question thus presented was

237.

Id.; GA. BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 104 (1992).

238.
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142 Ga. App. 476, 236 S.E.2d 168 (1977).
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whether claimant's operation of August 1975, to remove a neuroma in
the scar tissue, was precipitated by the 1974 accident or the 1975
accident. If due to the earlier accident, Argonaut would be liable for a
change in condition. Alternatively, Leatherby would be held liable if the
operation was due to what would have effectively been a finding of a
new accident in 1975.245

The A1. determined that the operation and ensuing disability were
due to the original accident."' Moreover, the judge found the injury
in 1975 was only of a temporary duration which had resolved itself by
August of 1975.247 Therefore, Leatherby was held liable for temporary
total disability benefits from May 14, 1975 until August 5, 1975.20
Argonaut was held liable for benefits after August 6, 1975 based on a
change in condition predicated on the original accident. 9
The Full Board affirmed the ALT's award." ° The superior court,
however, reversed and remanded because it detected no evidence to
support a change in condition finding."' The court of appeals reversed
the superior court and reinstated the AL's award. 2 Thus, Argonaut
was found to be liable for claimant's change in condition based on his
original injury."'
The next major case in this area was Slattery Associates, Inc. v.
Hufstetler,5 4 which conspicuously omitted any reference to, or reliance
upon, Leatherby. The court of appeals ruled:
that when other employment intervenes between an original award of
compensation and a claimant's subsequent disability, an award against
the original employer based on a "change of condition" is not, as a
matter of law, barred unless the subsequent employment, in which the
gradual worsening condition occurred, evidences a work environment
and work circumstances which are "new" and "different" from those
existing in the claimant's previous "ordinary work."'
In applying this rule to the facts of the case, the court found the
claimant did not encounter new or different circumstances at his new

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 477-78, 236 S.E.2d at 169.
Id. at 478, 236 S.E.2d at 169-70.
Id., 236 S.E.2d at 170.
Id.

249. Id.
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Id.
Id. at 480, 236 S.E.2d at 170.
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161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).
Id. at 395, 288 S.E.2d at 660.
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employer after his accident and before his disability." "[Tihe subsequent employments were therefore 'intervening' only in a temporal and
not a causal sense."M25 In light of this finding, the original employer/insurer was held liable for claimant's change in condition."8
An interesting adaptation of the above-stated rule occurred in Garrard
v. Pitts Plumbing Co."' The claimant was initially injured in 1980
when the backhoe he was running overturned. This accident resulted
in a herniated disc. The claimant's attempts to return to work at a wide
variety of jobs were unsuccessful, and he was unable to generate any
income aside from his workers' compensation benefits. "On November
26, he attempted to work at cutting down a tree, became dizzy and
passed out, and the severed treetop fell, dislocating his shoulder and
breaking five ribs.' °
The claimant asserted he took this job due to the receipt of a WC-2
indicating his benefits would be suspended on November 26.1 The
ALl found the severity of the original injury in 1980 prevented the
claimant from returning to the type of work in which he had previously
engaged.262 Further, the judge maintained that despite the fall from
the tree and the resulting injuries, the claimant remained totally
disabled. Therefore, he suffered no change in condition from the original
disability.'
This was adopted by the Full Board, but reversed by the
superior court.'
The court of appeals reinstated the AL's determination. 265 Of
primary consideration was the medical testimony illustrating that even
had the second accident not occurred, the claimant could not have
returned to his previous strenuous work activities. 2' "Only in the
infrequent case, as here, where there is clear testimony accepted by the
trior [sic] of fact to the effect that the original disability is continuing
and sufficient can the original employer be held responsible."267 The

256. Id. at 396, 288 S.E.2d at 661.
257. Id.
258. Id. See also Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bobchak, 194 Ga. App. 156, 390
S.E.2d 82 (1990); Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154, 338 S.E.2d 742 (1985);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Troglin, 148 Ga. App. 715, 252 S.E.2d 213 (1979);
Garner v. Atlantic Bldg. Sys., Inc., 142 Ga. App. 517, 236 S.E.2d 183 (1977).
259. 163 Ga. App. 457, 294 S.E.2d 658 (1982).
260. Id. at 457, 294 S.E.2d at 658-59.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 458, 294 S.E.2d at 659.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 457, 294 S.E.2d at 658.
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test is "whether disability resulting from the original, compensable
accident is in and of itself, an efficient contributing cause of the
claimant's inability to return to work."'
IV. TEMPORARY AGGRAVATION

Sometimes, a second accident will constitute the cause of a claimant's
disability. In this case, the employer/insurer on risk when the first
accident occurred may be held liable while the employer/insurer on risk
at the time of the second accident may not. Another possibility is that
the employer/insurer on risk at the time of the second accident may be
held liable for a temporary exacerbation of the underlying disability for
which the initial employer/insurer is responsible.
In the case of Ashley v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,'
the claimant injured his left arm while at work on May 10, 1968. This
injury required the claimant to undergo surgery. The claimant, however,
had broken the same bones eleven years earlier.' 0 The court in Ashley
held that "while the claimant may have sustained an accident on May
10, 1968, it was of a minor nature and produced no disability but that
the disability which the claimant has is a result 272of the accident of
1957. "271 Disability benefits were therefore denied.
court of appeals
In Garner v. Atlantic Building System, Inc., 3 the
274
attempted to define and clarify certain terms of art.
When the "aggravation" of a pre-existing condition was sufficient of
itself to constitute the cause of the claimant's inability to work this
court has held that the "aggravation" constituted a new injury ....
Unfortunately, this court has also used the word "aggravation" in a
situation where the claimant's condition, from the wear and tear of
performing his usual duties, continues to worsen to the point that he
can no longer perform the duties of his employment. Under these
circumstances the claimant has not sustained a new injury, but has
had [a] change of economic condition as to entitle him to compensation
for a change in condition under the original award.'
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The court further stated that "the State Board of Workers' Compensation
should, when referring to a new accident, use the word 'aggravation,' and
when referring to a condition which is not a new accident, use the
terminology gradual worsening or deterioration, or recurrence, as
appropriate to the circumstances.""76
27 discussed above,
In Leatherby Insurance Co. v. Hubbard,
the court
held the second fall resulted only in a temporary aggravation of the
original injury, and any disability resultant from the second fall had
completely resolved itself.27 Thus, the surgery the claimant underwenV after suffering the second accident was held to be a result of the
first accident.279 Since this accident led to the claimant's total disability,
the insurance company on risk at the time of the first accident was held
responsible for the claimant's subsequent total disability.'
The
insurance company on risk at the time of the second accident was held
liable for a three month period that the court determined was precipitated by an accident that occured while they were the company on risk.2 1
In PeachtreePlazaHotel v. Haynes, 2 the claimant originally injured
his back while working for the Peachtree Plaza Hotel as a bartender.
This injury required a laminectomy. Claimant then returned to light
duty work and remained for a period of five months. Thereafter, the
claimant went to work as a fast food manager for eight months, after
which he was forced to quit because the constant standing accentuated
the pain in his back. While riding on a MARTA escalator, the claimant
fell and then filed claim for a change in condition against Peachtree
Plaza Hotel seeking reinstatement of his benefits.m
The court of appeals ultimately held the escalator incident constituted
merely a temporary aggravation, and after a few days of intense pain
claimant returned to his prior position.2 "This evidence supports the
conclusion that (claimant) suffered a 'change in his condition' stemming
from the original trauma for which the original employer was liable.' s Relying on claimant's need to leave his position as a fast food
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277. 142 Ga. App. 476, 236 S.E.2d 168 (1977).
278. Id. at 479, 236 S.E.2d at 170.
279. Id
280. Id.
281. Id. See also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Moss, 197 Ga. App. 61, 397 S.E.2d 445
(1990); Gerrard v. Pitts Plumbing Co., 163 Ga. App. 457, 294 S.E.2d 658 (1982).
282. 163 Ga. App. 831, 296 S.E.2d 147 (1982).
283. Id. at 831, 296 S.E.2d at 148.
284. Id. at 832, 296 S.E.2d at 148.
285. Id. at 831, 296 S.E.2d at 148 (citing Slattery Assocs., Inc. v. Hufstetler, 161 Ga.
App. 389, 395, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Troglin, 148 Ga.
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manager, where claimant did not encounter "new circumstances," the
court held claimant's condition had changed for the worse before the
MARTA accident.'
Claimant could therefore recover benefits from
Peachtree Plaza Hotel based upon a change for the worse in his
condition attributable to the original accident. 7
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, certain ground rules may be posited. An initial claim
for compensation is an accident or a new accident. As such, the date the
disability manifests, itself will serve as the date of the accident for
statute of limitations purposes. In contrast, a change in condition occurs
if the claim is subsequent to a previous award or voluntary payment of
income benefits.
Liability for an accident or new accident will lie with the insurance
carrier on risk at the time of the disability; this may not be the same
carrier that was on risk at the time the accident actually occurred.
Liability for a change in condition, however, will be traced back to the
carrier on risk at the time of the original accident. A third possibility is
presented when a claimant is injured, returns to work, then suffers a
temporary aggravation or exacerbation of his injury. The employer/insurer at the time of the exacerbating injury will be liable only for
the amount of temporary disability occasioned by the aggravating event.
Thereafter, the court will find the employer and insurance carrier on
risk at the time of the original accident responsible for any continuing
disability.
From a litigation standpoint, it is recommended that a claimant's
attorney file an action against both the original employer and the
subsequent employer if any question exists as to whether the claimant
has suffered a change in condition or a new accident. The claimant's
attorney will therefore avoid the possibility of having unnecessary
bifurcated litigation. Further, the attorney will avoid the necessity of
bringing two separate actions if the first action determines the improper
defendant has been named.
While the primary goal of all claimants' attorneys is to secure benefits
for their clients, attorneys may side with one employer/insurer versus
another in attempting to demonstrate either a new accident or a change
in condition. This choice depends on the effect of either employer/insurer

App. 715, 252 S.E.2d 213 (1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 125 Ga. App.
328, 187 S.E.2d 551 (1972)).
286. Id. at 832, 296 S.E.2d at 148.
287. Id.
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on a claimant's average weekly wage and corresponding compensation
rate. If the injured employee generated a higher weekly wage after
returning to work subsequent to an earlier compensable accident, then
the employee would be well advised to establish the intervention of new
circumstances, an actual injury, or an independent aggravation of a prior
physical infirmity rather than showing a change in condition. Of course,
a valid and reasonable basis must be demonstrated to name any
employer/insurer as the defendant.
From the employer/insurer's standpoint, the presentation of evidence
will rely exclusively on whether it is attempting to show a change in
condition or a new accident. From the defense table, the specific
activities performed by the employee subsequent to his return to work,
the physical stress involved with subsequent work activities, and any
other new circumstances that may be identifiable will be the focus of
attention. In addition to a factual comparison between the various jobs
performed by the claimant, an examination of the medical records, to
determine whether a renewed period of disability is caused by the
gradual deterioration of the individual's condition or by a specific event,
will also be necessary.
Finally, due consideration must be given in preparation for any
hearing to recognize which party will bear the burden of proof. In any
initial claim for benefits, the claimant will bear the burden of proof,
whether in an all issues hearing or when asserting a new accident. The
employer/insurer will bear the burden of proving a positive change in the
claimant's condition when the claimant has not actually returned to
work. If the claimant has returned to work subsequent to the occurrence
of a compensable accident and thereafter asserts a renewed entitlement
to disability, the claimant will bear the burden of proof.
When an injured employee returns to work and is subsequently
discharged or released for reasons unrelated to the original injury, the
claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a
diligent search for other suitable employment was unsuccessful because
of the on-the-job accident. To carry this burden, claimants must
demonstrate that they are unable to secure alternative suitable
employment. The best evidence of this requirement is proof that they
were denied employment because of the physical infirmity resulting from
their compensable accident.

